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Income Distribution and Trade Pattern
Abstract
Motivated by recent insights from behavioral economics and social psychology, we present a
theory of trade that seeks to explain inter-industry trade between countries that are similar in
their production sides, but dier in their income distribution. By assuming status-dependent
preferences that are non-homothetic, we show that income inequality dierential can be a
basis for inter-industry trade between otherwise similar economies.
1 Introduction
Classical and neoclassical trade theory posits dierences in relative factor endowments across
countries as the basis for international trade (see Jones, 1965). Empirical studies, however,
reveal that the bulk of world trade takes place between `similar' countries, i.e., countries that
virtually have no supply side dierences. This has been noted by Krugman (1979) and Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), among others. In this paper, based on recent insights from behavioral
economics and social psychology, we develop a simple theory to explain trade between countries
with identical factor endowments by focusing on the role of income distribution. Specically,
we construct a `behavioral' version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model involving two countries, two
factors of production, and two goods: a status good whose consumption is, at least, partly driven
by the prestige value associated with it (e.g., branded clothing) and a non-status good which has
no prestige value (e.g., non-branded clothing). We show how dierences in preexisting levels of
income inequality across countries may potentially determine the pattern of international trade
when individuals have status dependent preferences that are non-homothetic.
Previous studies that seek to explain trade between countries with similar factor endowments
emphasize either on increasing returns to scale and product dierentiation (e.g., Krugman, 1979,
and Helpman, 1981) or on technological dierences across countries (e.g., Davis, 1998). These
papers assume preferences to be strictly homothetic and focus solely on the production sides
of economies. However, some empirical ndings provide compelling evidence that preferences
may not be homothetic (e.g., see Thursby and Thursby, 1987). Studies that systematically
incorporate non-homotheticity preferences oer a strictly demand-side explanation for a range
of phenomenon like home bias in consumption, the mystery of missing trade and volume of trade
include Markusen (1986), Hunter (1991), and Mitra and Trindade (2005), among a few others.
While a few of these studies have considered the role of income distribution in international trade
(e.g., Mitra and Trindade, 2005), none have specically explored the link between inequality and
trade involving status goods from a `behavioral' perspective, as we do.1 While there may be
disagreement on measurement of inequality in the literature, we use the simplest denition (i.e.,
the percentage of earned income).2
2 The Model
There are two goods, a status good (S) and a non-status good (N). There are also two factors
of production, capital and labor denoted by K and L, respectively. We impose all neoclassical
assumptions, including constant returns to scale, on production functions for S and N . Further,
we assume that S is a capital intensive good, there is no factor intensity reversal, and all markets
are perfectly competitive.
Individuals (indexed by subscript i) care not only about absolute consumption of the two
goods but are also concerned with their social status, which is now widely recognized by be-
havioral economists as one of the key motivations in human behavior (for example, see Weiss
and Fershtmen, 1998). Social status confers psychological rewards like self esteem and sense of
power (Rucker and Galinsky, 2008). Following Clark et al. (2008), we dene social status of an
individual i, denoted by Λi, as the income of individual yi relative to the average income in the





Clearly, the higher (lower) is an individual's income relative to the average income, the greater
(lower) is her social status.
To formally characterize the behavior of individuals, we invoke two axioms based on recent
insights from behavioral economics and social psychology. Our rst axiom addresses how concern
for social status aects wellbeing of individuals. Towards that end, we note recent empirical
ndings suggesting that an increase in status does not result in an `equal' increase in wellbeing
of all individuals across income distribution. Specically, using a micro panel data from Germany,
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) nds robust evidence that poorer individuals well-being is negatively
inuenced by the fact that their income is lower than that of their reference group, while richer
1Our paper is related to Grossman and Shapiro (1988) that considers trade in status goods. However, the
issue that they are concerned with is foreign counterfeiting of such goods which is tangentially related to this
note. Our paper is also related to Chakrabarti (2000) and Pi and Zhou (2015). These papers examine the impact
of international trade on inequality. We, instead, focus on the converse relationship.
2See Cowell and Flachaire (2017) for various measurements of inequality.
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individuals do not get happier from having an income above the average. Similar ndings
have also been reported by Blanchower and Oswald (2004). These ndings are in congruence
with the predictions of Duesenberry (1949), Hollander (2001), and Frank (1985) that income
comparisons are asymmetric and seem to suggest that the psychological rewards that status
confers is important for wellbeing of those who belong to the lower end of the social ladder, but
not important for those who belong to the higher end. This observation leads to our rst axiom:
Axiom 1. `Falling behind' hurts: having less income below the average level in a society reduces
individual utility but having more income above the average does not matter.
Our next axiom has to do with an individual's tendency toward substituting status good
rather for non-status good. In a recent study, Sivanathan and Petit (2010) note that, since
lack of status psychologically hurts those who `fall behind' and may induce chronic `self-threat'
among them, these individuals are likely to seek indirect opportunities to compensate for the loss
of happiness and to restore their self worth. They hypothesize that one indirect route through
which the individuals who fall behind attempt to restore self-worth could be by consuming status
infused goods. The argument is that given the intimate connection between self and possessions
(Beggan, 1992), consumption of status goods can potentially serve as an indirect source of self-
armation for wounded egos (i.e., those who are psychologically hurt from not being able to
keep up with the rest). In order to test this hypothesis, Sivanathan and Petit (2010) carry out a
series of laboratory and eld experiments. Strikingly, they nd strong evidence in favor of their
hypothesis. Specically, they nd that threatened individuals seek out status goods to soothe
their psychological pain and that consumption of such goods is, at least partially, motivated by
their bruised self esteem.3 Thus, we have our second axiom as follows:
Axiom 2. `Falling behind' increases the marginal rate of substitution for the status to non-status
goods.
That is, people with lower than average income are willing to give up more of the non-status
good to consume an extra unit of the status good.
Based on the above axioms we devise the following utility function to represent the preferences
of a representative individual i:
U(Ni, Si,Λi) = f (Λi) [logNi + φ (Λi) logSi] (2)
3Note that this explanation of status consumption is an alternative to the `wealth signaling' explanation of
this phenomenon (see Dwibedi and Marjit (2017).
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where f(Λi) < 1, ∀Λi < 1, and f(Λi) = 1,∀Λi ≥ 1. Also, we assume that φ(Λi) > 1,∀Λi < 1, and
φ(Λi) = 1,∀Λi ≥ 1. Moreover, we assume f ′(Λi) > 0, ∀Λi < 1 (Axiom 1), and φ′(Λi) < 0,∀Λi < 1
(Axiom 2). For sake of tractability, we shall assume for Λi < 1, f (Λi) = Λi and φ (Λi) = 1/Λi.
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Note that the utility function that we have developed is non-homothetic as long as income
inequality is non-zero.5
We assume that the economy consists of two homogeneous groups of people, each with unity
mass: the rich and the poor, denoted by R and P , respectively. The share of R in the economy's
labor and capital stock is σ, where σ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Then, this share for group P is 1 − σ. Thus,
incomes of the groups R and P are respectively given by:
yR = σ(wL̄+ rK̄), yP = (1− σ)(wL̄+ rK̄) (3)
where w and r denote the wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respectively. Moreover, L̄
and K̄ are xed stocks of of labor and capital. Note that income inequality increases with σ. If
σ = 1/2 (σ = 1), there is perfect income equality (inequality).6
Assuming that the non-status good is the numeraire good, letting p denote the price of the
status good, and recalling that each group has a unit mass, we obtain the status good demand
functions as:




SP (p, σ, w, r, L̄, K̄) =
(1− σ)(wL̄+ rK̄)
p [1 + 2(1− σ)]
(5)
where Sj denotes equilibrium consumptions of the status good by group j = R,P . Consequently,
aggregate equilibrium consumption of the status good is given by:





p [1 + 2(1− σ)]
(6)





) = logN∗i > 0. That is, falling
behind hurts.
5As it turns out, our results are quite robust to alternative and perhaps more widely used utility functions.
For example, our results would hold if we had used a CES-type utility function given by:





where 0 < α < 1 and the restrictions on f(.) and φ(.) are as above (see Marjit et al. (2015)).
6While there may be disagreement on measurement of inequality in the literature, we use the simplest denition
(i.e., the percentage of earned income). See Cowell and Flachaire (2017) for various measurements of inequality.
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The aggregate non-status consumption can be derived similarly. Next, we characterize the closed
economy equilibrium.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
We rst characterize the equilibrium of a closed economy by discussing two important properties
of aggregate status good consumption. In addition to the intrinsic value of these properties, as
we shall show shortly, they will be instrumental in determining the pattern of trade in an open
economy setting.
Consider the impact of an increase in inequality on aggregate consumption of status good,
ceteris paribus. The following result highlights that the aggregate consumption of status good
is a non-monotonic function of inequality level.
Proposition 1. The relationship between the aggregate consumption of status good and the level
of inequality, ceteris paribus, is inverted u-shaped. In particular, aggregate consumption of the
status good peaks at σ∗ = (3−
√
2)/2 at any given price.







(3− 2σ)2 − 2
]
(7)
It follows from equation (7) that ∂S̃/∂σ > (<)0 if and only if σ < [3−
√
2]/2 (σ > [3−
√
2]/2).
In particular, ∂S̃/∂σ = 0 if σ∗ = (3−
√
2)/2.
The intuition behind this result is interesting. A redistribution of income from the rich class
to the poor would have dierent eect on status good depending the initial distribution. If the
poor are too poor (σ > σ∗), then a small redistribution of income from rich to poor (i.e., a small
reduction in σ) will increase the consumption of status good. Such a small income redistribution
reduces the consumption of status good by the rich since their income falls. However, the rise in
consumption of this good by the poor class (due to such a type of income redistribution) is more
than enough to oset its reduction by the rich. Thus, the aggregate consumption of status good
rises. The converse is true when poor are not too poor (i.e., σ < σ∗). That is, an equal small
income redistribution from the rich to the poor class will cause a bigger increase in consumption
of status good by the poor class if the poor class are too poor than when they are not-so-poor.
This is because the farther away the poor are from the average, the unhappier they are and
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hence the very poor are likely to spend more resources in soothing their psychological pain
of relative deprivation compared to the not-so-poor. Consequently, when the poor are not-so-
poor (too poor), the decrease in status consumption of the rich outweighs (is outweighed by)
the increase in status consumption of the poor. In other words, when the level of preexisting
inequality is low (high), a small fall in inequality will cause aggregate status consumption to fall
(rise). Therefore, the relationship between consumption of status good and the level of inequality
is inverted U-shaped.
Next, consider the relation between aggregate demand for status good and its price. Suppose
there is an increase in price of status goods. Apart from price aecting demand for the status
good via the standard substitution and income eects, it inuences demand for the status good
through two additional channels. First, price changes the factor prices (an important point to
which we return shortly) and this in turn aects income of the two groups of consumers. This
is an additional income eect that arises due to the general equilibrium aspect of our setup and
its ownership structure of the production factors. Second, price impacts the relative income
which in turn has implications for status good via function φ(.). However, this eect is limited
to the poor. Due to these additional channels through which price inuences aggregate status
good consumption, the relation between price and demand for the status good is ambiguous. Let
εj ≡ (∂yj/∂p)(p/yj) be price (of status good) elasticity of income for income group j =, P,R. As
it turns out, this elasticity plays a crucial role in ensuring a well-behaved aggregate demand for
status good. The following result establishes a sucient condition for price to have a negative
impact on status good consumption.
Proposition 2. Aggregate demand for status good is decreasing in its price if εj < 1, j = P,R.











implying that ∂SR/∂p < 0 if εR < 1. Similarly, it can be shown from equations (3) and (5) that
∂SP /∂p < 0 if εP < 1. Then, the statement of this proposition directly follows from equation
(6).
Given that consumption level for status good is not monotonic in changes in income inequality,
it is interesting to study how prices behave in this economy with respect to a change in income
inequality. Suppose that initially σ < σ∗ and consider a small increase in inequality, ceteris
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paribus. Since there is no change in factor endowment and production technologies but the
consumption of status good (thus its production) rises due to Proposition 1 (a shift in demand
and a movement along the supply for this good), p must rise. In other words, the demand for
status good shifts up while its supply function is unchanged, leading to an increase in its price.
The converse it true if σ > σ∗. Thus we have the following result.
Proposition 3. The price of status good is increasing (decreasing) in the level of inequality σ if
σ < σ∗ (σ > σ∗).
Next, consider the eects of an increase in inequality on factor prices. Again, start with a
case where σ < σ∗. It directly follows form Proposition 3 and Stolper-Samuelson Theorem that
an innitesimally small increase in σ will increase r/p and lower w/p. Moreover, the opposite is
true if σ > σ∗. Therefore, we highlight the following results.
Proposition 4. The real return to capital (labor) is increasing (decreasing) in income inequality
if σ < σ∗. The converse is true if σ > σ∗.
4 Trading equilibrium and pattern of trade
Now suppose that there are two countries: Country 1 and Country 2. We use superscripts to
denote countries. Assume that Country 1 has a more equal income distribution than Country
2, i.e., σ1 < σ2. Maintain that both countries have identical factor endowments and technology.
As such, the supply curve for the status (and non-status good) that each country faces is the
same. Assuming that the sucient condition given by Proposition 2 holds, each country faces a
downward sloping aggregate demand curve. It follows from Proposition 1 that Country 2 faces
a higher (lower) demand for status good than Country 1 does if σ1 < σ2 < σ∗ (σ∗ < σ1 < σ2).
Proposition 3 implies that the relative price of status good would be higher in Country 2 than in
Country 1 at autarky equilibrium (i.e., p2 > p1) if preexisting levels of inequality in both countries
are suciently low. Conversely, this relative price will be higher in Country 1 than Country 2 if
preexisting levels of inequality in both countries are suciently high. Finally, directly following
from Proposition 4, we have r2 > r1 and w1 > w2 if σ1 < σ2 < σ∗ at autarky equilibrium.
Consider the case that inequality is higher in country 2, but measure of inequality in both
countries are lower than the threshold level, i.e., σ1 < σ2 < σ∗. Maintain that the condition
of Proposition 2 also holds. If these countries open up their economies to trade, Country 1
exports (imports) status good (non-status good) and Country 2 exports (imports) non-status
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good (status good) since relative price of status good is lower in Country 1 than in Country 2
at autarky. The opposite pattern of trade emerges if σ∗ < σ1 < σ2. We highlight this result in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let εj < 1, j = P,R. Assuming free trade, Country 1 will export (import) status
good (non-status good) while Country 2's pattern of trade will be the opposite if σ1 < σ2 < σ∗.
The converse patterns of trade will occur if σ∗ < σ1 < σ2.
Recall that production sides of these two economies are identical and neither have comparative
advantage in production of any good. Yet, inter-industry trade takes place between them due
to demand dierences for status good arising from higher level of inequality in one country than
the other. It is also straightforward to see that the pattern of trade as characterized in the
proposition hold if σ∗ < σ2 < σ1 (σ2 < σ1 < σ∗). That is, due to symmetry, Country 1 (2 )
exports status good if σ∗ < σ2 < σ1 (σ2 < σ1 < σ∗).
Figures 1 and 2 show the open economy equilibria when the countries have suciently low
and suciently high levels of income inequality respectively. The world average supply curve
is same as the individual supply curves, i.e., Y 1S = Y
2
S = YS since there are no supply side
dierences between the countries. The aggregate demand curves for the two countries are given
by Y 1D and Y
2





The intersection of the average supply and demand curves determine the free trade equilibrium
(relative) price and quantity of status good which we denote as pW and S̃W respectively. After
trade is opened up, price of status good, as well as rental-wage ratio falls in Country 2 and
rises in Country 1 when the preexisting levels of inequality in the two countries are suciently
low and the opposite happens when the countries are characterized by suciently high levels
of inequality to start with. Thus, when the levels of preexisting inequality are low in both the
countries, Country 2 exports the non-status good and imports the status good and Country
1 does the opposite. However, when the preexisting levels of inequality are high in the two
countries, Country 1 exports the non-status good and imports the status good and Country 2
does the opposite.
At a rst glance, it may seem that the pattern of trade is indeterminate if both countries have
`large' enough dierence in their levels of inequality. However, a more careful examination of our
model reveals a complete characterization of trade pattern.7 To show this, consider the eects of
various combination of σ1 and σ2 on the demand for status good and its price dierential in these

























Figure 2: σ∗ < σ1 < σ2
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countries. Suppose that σ1 = σ2 = σ∗. It directly follows from equation (6) that the demand
for status good is the same in both countries and so is its price. Now, let σ1 decrease from σ∗.
Then, it follows form Proposition 1 that the demand for status good decreases in Country 1.
On the other hand, demand for status good also decreases in Country 2 if σ2 increases from σ∗.
Hence, for any σ1 < σ∗, there is an associated level of σ2 > σ∗ at which the demand for status
good and its price are the same in both countries. In particular, as is directly evident form
equation (6), the demand for status good is the same in both countries if σ1 = 1/2 and σ2 = 1.
Symmetry also dictates that such a relation ship holds for σ1 > σ∗, i.e., for any σ1 > σ∗, there is
an associated level of σ2 < σ∗ for which demand for status good and its price would be the same
in both countries. Denote such σ1 and σ2 loci by σ2 = ξ(σ1). That is, if σ2 = ξ(σ1), then the
autarky price of the status good is equal in both countries. It also follows from Proposition 1
that p1 < p2 at autarky if σ∗ < σ2 < ξ(σ1) where σ1 < σ∗ or if σ∗ > σ2 > ξ(σ1) where σ1 > σ∗.
Conversely, p1 > p2 at autarky if σ2 > ξ(σ1) where σ1 < σ∗ or if σ2 < ξ(σ1) where σ1 > σ∗.
Hence, we have the following result.
Proposition 6. Assume εj < 1, j = P,R. At free trade, Country 1 (2) will export status good
(non-status good) if (i) σ∗ < σ2 < ξ(σ1) where σ1 < σ∗; or (ii) σ∗ > σ2 > ξ(σ1) where σ1 > σ∗.
Conversely, Country 2 (1) will export status good (non-status good) if (i) σ2 > ξ(σ1) where
σ1 < σ∗; or (ii) σ2 < ξ(σ1) where σ1 > σ∗
Figure 3 presents our characterization of trade pattern schematically, where relationship
σ2 = ξ(σ1) is shown by curve ξeξ′. Proposition 5 addresses scenarios where σ1 and σ2 belong
to areas A,B,A′ and B′. Country 1 exports the status good if σ1 and σ2 belong to area A
and Country 2 exports this good if the inequality levels are in area B. Note that the level of
inequality is higher in Country 2 than in Country 1 under both of these scenarios. i.e., σ1 < σ2.
Due to symmetry, Proposition 5 also implies that Country 1 exports the status good in area
A′ whereas Country 2 exports this good if inequality parameters fall in area B′. Proposition
6 addresses scenarios where σ1 and σ2 fall in areas C,D,C ′ and D′. Consider areas C and D.
Recall that for all combinations of σ1 and σ2 along ξeξ′ autarky price of the status good is equal
across both countries, whereas the price of this good is lower in Country 1 (2) if these inequity
parameters are in area C (D). Therefore, Country 1 (Country 2) exports the status good in area



















Figure 3: Trade Pattern and combinations of σ1 and σ2
5 Conclusion
We incorporate demand side dierences across countries, arising from cross-country preference
dierential toward status goods due to varying degree of income inequality, in a standard model
of international trade assuming that these countries have identical production sides. We base our
formulation of preferences on insights from behavioral economics and social psychology. We show
how dierences in preexisting levels of inequality across countries may be a basis for international
trade and may determine the pattern of trade when individual preferences are non-homothetic.
Although our model is stylized, it oers a new simple and elegant setup that may explain trade
between countries in absence of supply side dierences.
As an extension of our model, one may consider a monopolistic competitive setup (as in
Oladi and Gilbert, 2011, Gilbert et al., 2015, and Pi and Zhou, 2015) where there is continuum
of goods that could be ordered by status ranking. This is likely to yield very detailed predictions
concerning trade patterns. Our theory may also guide empiricists to study bilateral trade in
status goods between countries with dierent levels of income distribution. Most importantly,
our paper is agnostic with regard to sources of inequality (i.e., the reason why σ may be dierent
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across countries). Recall that the aggregate income is the same in both countries under free
trade. Hence, it may not be straightforward why income distributions dier between these
countries. One may extend our model to exploit the micro structure of inequality and its eects
on trade pattern. For example, one may assume a particular combination of factor ownership by
inhabitants in each country, as in Mayer (1984), that potentially gives rise to diering degree of
inequality between these two countries, while resulting in the same level of aggregate income for
both countries.8
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention.
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